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Abstract
India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) created the first political website in India during the
year 1998 and continues to maintain an active online presence. The two most popular places for
computer and Internet usage are college campuses and offices—places frequented by members
of India’s growing middle class. As the BJP’s supporters have traditionally come from middleclass, upper-caste social backgrounds, this group has particular importance to the BJP’s political
success, thus the BJP’s online publications may establish hegemony of the middle class and its
ideals. For these reasons, studying the BJP’s online group-identity and political message has
salience.
May 2004 to May 2009 marks the first point in the 21st century that the BJP did not form
the national government. Research shows that when a political group lacks the power it seeks to
attain it will work harder to expose its opponents’ weaknesses and gain political support, which
may involve an enhanced communications campaign and use of mass media. Thus, this thesis
textually analyzed 62 documents published between May 2004 and May 2009 related to how the
BJP constructs its group identity and its political message from the “About Us” and “Speeches”
section of www.bjp.org.
From conducting this research, this author found that the BJP constructs their political
opponents as inherently bad for India because of their poor national security, development, and
social policies. Meanwhile, the BJP constructs themselves as the political party best able to help
India reach success through nurturing an ‘integrated’ society that cares for people from all
socioeconomic backgrounds, development initiatives, and a strong national security policy.

The Internet enables the BJP to control the content, distribution and discussion around
their ideas in the construction of their own version of social reality that has the potential to reach
those living in India and those Indians living abroad. This is a troubling idea in as far as the
ground-reality of life in India differs from the messages presented by the BJP and the Internet
serves as a silencing device for those who lack the material means to speak out against the BJP’s
messages.
Keywords: globalization, Internet, India’s middle class, diaspora, Hindu nationalism
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The media began to play a more important role in Indian political campaigns during Rajiv
Gandhi’s 1984-bid for the position of prime minister after the assassination of his mother, Indira
Gandhi (Chopra, 2006). Gandhi’s successful election-bid served as the most-advanced use of
media in Indian political campaigns at that point in time (Gould, 1986; Karan, 2009). Since
Gandhi’s successful 1984 media-led campaign, mass media continue to play a significant role in
Indian politics (Karan, 2009).
Gandhi’s 1984 campaign created avenues for politicians to use more advanced forms of
media during political campaigns, which include (but are not limited to) use of the Internet
(Karan, 2009). The increased importance of the Internet for political purposes parallels the
growing trend in Internet usage within India. According to a World Bank (2009) report, the
number of personal computers owned in India increased from 0.50 per hundred persons in 2000
to 3.30 per hundred persons in 2008. In addition, Internet users have increased within India from
0.50 persons per 100 in 2000 to 4.50 persons per 100 in 2008 (World Bank Report, 2009). Thus,
because of the increased use of the Internet by both political groups and their potential voters,
studying the use of the Internet by political groups in India has significance.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) created the first political website—within India—
during the 1998 election season and twelve years later continues to maintain an active online
presence (Karan, 2009).

According to Robert Hardgrave (1993), the mass media have an

important role to play in the BJP’s ability to shape and project a pan-Indian Hindu national
identity. Mass media do so by allowing the BJP to project a single image that reaches its wide
constituency, which allows disparate groups to overlook their differences and unite according to
a shared ideology (Hardgrave, 1993). As a relatively recent development in Indian political
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campaigns, Kavita Karan (2009) suggests that one of the gaps in the literature concerns research
on the Internet’s impact on the electorate and its ability to construct a homogenous political
identity for party supporters. As such, this paper hopes to fill this gap in the research by
considering the following research questions and sub-questions:
RQ1: How does the BJP use its Internet site to construct its political message?
RQ1a: How does the BJP construct its group identity?
RQ1b: How does the BJP construct its political message?
RQ2: How does the Internet enable the BJP to spread its political message?
The BJP promotes a Hindu-nationalist (Hindutva) ideology. In Hindi, Hindutva means
“Hindu-ness” and when used in a political context the term denotes equating “Indian-ness” with
“Hindu-ness”.
India’s middle class serves as one target audience for the BJP’s online message of Hindu
nationalism (Hindutva), because it represents one of the most dynamic, growing populations
within India. As of 2011, the middle class comprised 13.1% of India’s population (PTI, 2011).
Estimates claim that the middle class will account for 20.3% of India’s population by 2015-2016
and 37.2% of its population by 2025-2026—thus comprising a plurality of the population and the
electorate (PTI, 2011).
Aside from estimates of its growth, there exist other reasons that make the middle class
significant to any political organization interested in broadcasting its ideology online. A report
by the Internet & Mobile Association of India states that offices and college campuses represent
two of the most popular locations for Indians to access the Internet (IAMAI, 2007). These also
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happen to be locations frequented by the middle-class. In addition, even though it may be more
common for middle class individuals to access the Internet while at work, this group owns 53.2%
of all personal computers within India (PTI, 2011). Consider that fact in tandem with the idea
that 70.0% of those familiar with personal computers use the Internet and that 25.0% (as of
2007) of Internet users access the Internet daily, then this provides ample reason for the BJP to
target a middle class audience with the propagation of its online ideology (IAMAI, 2007).
In summary, India’s middle class represents a group of growing importance. Because of
the increased usage of the Internet within India and the importance of the Internet in politics,
studying the political usage of the Internet within an Indian context has significance. This paper
will textually analyze the Internet site used and maintained by the Hindu-nationalist BJP. The
purpose of this textual analysis study is to understand the construction of the BJP’s political
message on its website: www.bjp.org.
The following two chapters will provide further examination of the theoretical constructs
used in this paper, as well as the paper’s methodology. Chapter 2, the literature review, will
provide an understanding of the BJP’s political ideology and its relationship to India’s middle
class. After reading Chapter 2, the reader will understand the significance of the middle-class to
Indian politics and how the Internet functions in propagating the BJP’s political message.
Chapter 3 will explore the rationale for undergoing a textual analysis of www.bjp.org. After
reading this chapter, the reader will understand why textual analysis serves as the best method
for understanding the construction of the BJP’s political ideology and how I chose to analyze the
website’s contents.

Atterberry 9

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Prior to India gaining independence in 1947, foreigners frequently shaped India’s
national and international image in such a way that it on occasion supported the idea of India’s
exoticness and justified the maintenance of colonial rule (Dirks, 2004). For example, after the
Great Revolt of 1857, British colonial powers deemed it increasingly important to understand
how criminality manifests itself in India and did so by constructing a taxonomy—according to
race and caste—that provided the groundwork for managing perceived criminals (Brown, 2001).
In other words, part of the pre-independence colonial project involved the domination of the
British through the careful construction and maintenance of a particular image of the Indiansubject (Brown, 2001).
Post-independence, Indians could shape India’s national and international image
according to their own dictates. One of the earliest debates concerning India’s image involved a
discussion of whether India should be represented as a Hindu-state or a secular-state. Mounting
tensions within the Congress Party over this issue forced some of this group’s communallyinclined members to form the Jana Sangh, which would later become the Bharatiya Janata Party
(Chhibber, 1997).
Overview of Hindu Nationalism (Hindutva)
In the ideology’s founding text “Hindutva—or who is a Hindu?” Vinayak Damodar
Savarkar elaborates on the definition of Hindutva (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000). His definition states
that only Hindus—those of a common Aryan race, nation, and civilization—may take an active
role in the nation’s state craft, while permanently relegating all others to the position of outsiders
(Hansen, 1999).
Savarkar’s message of Hindutva has prominence today through political organizations
such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP espouses a form of Hindutva—or Hindu
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nationalism—that advocates for the Indian state’s organization according to “Hindu” dictates
(Bhatt & Mukta, 2000). This idea’s vagueness enables its potency as it allows the BJP to define
the meaning of “Hindu” and “Hindu-ness” for its voting public, whose definition actively shapes
the BJP’s social and political agenda (Fernandes & Heller, 2006; Oldenburg, 2011).
Hindu nationalism’s prominence within India continues to grow since its formal
inception in 1923.

As such people have literally fought and killed on behalf of Hindu

nationalism. One of the worst cases of violence to-date would be the riots that occurred in 2002
after the deaths of 60 Hindu pilgrims in Gujarat in which 1000 people—the majority of those
Muslim—were killed. This event does not overshadow other incidents such as the killing of an
Australian missionary (Graham Staines) and his two sons in 1999 and the 2000 deaths that
resulted from riots across India in the aftermath of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992.
Despite the violence associated with this political ideology, organizations such as the BJP derive
their success in-part through establishing Hindutva as a common ideology of modern Indian
politics.
Hindu nationalism and the middle class
The history of India’s middle class extends to pre-independence when the colonialists
actively sought to construct Indian subjects who could help with the colonial project of
governing (Fernandes, 2006). The upper-caste, middle-class community constructed during
colonialism relied heavily on its English-language training in order to access increased economic
power (Fernandes, 2006).

Because of their lack of economic and political leadership—in

conjunction with experiences of persistent racial discrimination—India’s middle class began to
enact its identity through the public sphere (Sarkar, 1983). Often the middle class image within
the public sphere centered on the discourses of temperance, appropriate gender roles,
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respectability, and moral degeneration (Fernandes, 2006). While the middle-class preached
about morality in public, this group’s private sphere became increasingly politicized along the
lines of religion as this group began to establish a strong Hindu identity as a perceived antidote
to the threat posed by the Christian colonialists (van der Veer, 2002). Therefore, the middle
class simultaneously developed an increasingly public persona and a deeper attachment to its
Hindu identity.
Post-independence, India’s middle-class continued to flourish under Nehru’s leadership
and his state-led development initiatives. Nehru fostered the growth of the middle class via
subsidized education and access to government jobs (Fernandes, 2006; Nigam, 2009). Despite
the positive work of Nehru in helping to maintain India’s middle class, disenchantment with
state-led development began to take root during the late 1980s and into the early 1990s.
During the 1980s, Rajiv Gandhi moved India away from state-led development and
towards market-led development. Because of this shift, many of those individuals within the
middle class—especially those of the upper castes—began to experience some of the benefits of
liberalization: such as access to more commodities and better paying jobs. This resulted in
India’s middle class yearning for more of the privileges offered to them via economic
liberalization. The BJP sensed this desire amongst the middle class and so established itself as
the pro-liberalizaton party and so, aligned itself with the interests of the middle class (Fernandes,
2006).
Beyond establishing itself as pro-liberalization, the BJP also began to advocate for
members of the middle class—particularly those of the upper castes—along cultural lines. After
the release of the Mandal Commission Reports and the subsequent affirmative action policies
established throughout the country, members of India’s upper caste, middle class communities
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began to protest (e.g. self-immolation) what they felt was discriminatory treatment (Bhatt &
Mukta, 2000). In addition, middle class sentiment began to think of the Congress Party as the
political playground of the lower-castes and religious minorities.

Due to feelings of

marginalization and the increased enfranchisement of lower caste communities, the middle class
needed a party able to represent its desire for economic liberalization paired with social
conservatism (Bhatt & Mukta, 2000).
India’s Middle Class & Globalization
The need for a social ordering device became more necessary because the contours of
what constituted India’s middle class began to change due to the processes of globalization. For
example, the US Immigrant Act of 1965 allowed for a higher quota of Asian Indian immigrants
and so encouraged the migration of individuals out of India and into the US (Chopra, 2006).
Thus, 1970s India witnessed a large migration of talented individuals out of India to the US
(Chaturvedi, 2005). Unlike the Nehru-generation that thought of India’s diaspora as traitors to
the process of nation-building, in the 1980s Rajiv Gandhi sought to incorporate this group into
the new national project of India’s liberalization (Chopra, 2006). As such, this group began to
embody the very promises of globalization through their ability to gain enough human capital to
migrate to other countries in order to gain additional educational and professional opportunities.
Concurrently, as the character of the middle class began to develop and change, its need for a
mechanism to establish social order became increasingly pronounced.
While India redefined the parameters of the nation under globalization, Asian Indian
Hindus began to redefine their social identity within their new country of residence (Robinson,
2004). Scholars point to several reasons underlying Asian Indian Hindus’ desire to redefine their
social identity within their new country of residence: (a) feelings of marginality; (b) a sense of
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cultural detachment; and (c) fear that their children will not grow up with the correct cultural
roots (Kurien, 2004). As a result, some turn to Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) organizations to
find answers to their cultural questions or to culturally educate their children in what it means to
be a Hindu (Kurien, 2004).
Identity construction & the Hindu diaspora
Roots and routes have great importance in the process of identity construction (Murgi,
2008). According to Karim Murgi (2008), roots have a backward orientation and typically
describe where someone is from, whereas routes typically have a forward orientation and
describe the process of identity formation. These two concepts play a dynamic role in the
process of an individual’s identity construction (Murgi, 2008).
The idea of connecting one’s past to the present has particular salience in immigrant
communities. In an immigrant’s country of migration she will confront new social norms that
differ from those found in her culture of origin (Phinney, 2000). These new social norms
dynamically interact with the cultural norms of an immigrant’s respective country of origin,
especially in terms of enabling the immigrant to then construct roots and routes.
The process of immigrant identity construction does not take place exclusively at the
level of the individual. The formation of a group whose members purport to share a similar
identity has an important role in the immigrant experience of identity construction. Diaspora
serves as a term often used to describe such communities (e.g. Bhatia, 2007; Varma, 2007; Lal,
2008; Kapur, 2010; Prashad, 2000). Rogers Brubaker (2005) clearly defines a diaspora in terms
of three criteria: (a) dispersion: a settled group of people that lives outside of a perceived
homeland; (b) homeland orientation: where a specific (real or imagined) place serves as a point
of reference in the process of value-and identity-construction; and (c) boundary maintenance:
the continued transference of cultural values across generations that enables a group to define
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itself in relation to others. In other words, the term diaspora describes a group of people who
live outside of a real or imagined homeland, who continue to use (the idea of) that homeland as a
source of identity construction to define themselves in relation to members of that same group, as
well as perceived outsiders.
Three terms have special significance in the process of talking about the diaspora as it
relates to the South Asian experience: non-resident Indian (NRI), person of Indian origin (PIO),
and Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) (Brubaker, 2005; Murgi, 2008). India’s Ministry of Home
Affairs neatly defines all three terms and their differences. An NRI is a person of Indian
citizenship, who holds an Indian passport, but resides outside of India; meanwhile a PIO is a
person of Indian descent, who has the nationality and citizenship of another country, and is a
foreign passport holder (Comparative Chart). The last term: OCI— represents a PIO from any
country who never held citizenship in either Bangladesh or Pakistan and does not have family
members (up to four generations prior) who held citizenship in either of these countries.
All three terms serve to acknowledge an individual’s life in a new country but actively
work to maintain an individual’s connection with both a physical and psychically constructed
homeland. Thus, the work of Hindu nationalist groups in constructing a strong network of
Hindus in the diaspora mirrors the efforts of the Republic of India in figuring out additional ways
to tie members of the (more general) Indian diaspora to the subcontinent.
Public relations, agenda-setting, framing & the Internet
The Internet enables politicians to communicate with their publics in ways that other
media (e.g. television) do not allow. For example, the Internet enables senders to have complete
control over the message that they want their audience to see at a limited cost (Park & Choi,
2002). The Internet also enables political groups to gain increased visibility because information
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on their site can be accessed virtually anywhere by anyone with an Internet connection, which
can help political groups in their ability to foster understanding and build relationships with their
audience (Kenski & Stroud, 2006; White & Raman, 2000). Some scholars argue that websites
function as a status symbol for the communities they serve in that possessing a website is
indicative of a group’s quality (White & Raman 2000). Thus, having a website is important to
an organization such as the Bharatiya Janata Party because it enables the BJP to better connect
with its supporters and serves as an indicator to the public of the group’s social and political
significance.
Aside from serving as a signaling device, having a website enables the BJP to display the
content that it views as important. As such the BJP can use their Internet site as a way to attempt
to influence the public agenda by creating its own political agenda via its website. Agendasetting describes the media’s ability to influence the public by making certain issues seem more
important (Weaver, 2007). This process of agenda-setting has two different levels: the first
level of agenda setting refers to the importance of particular issues; whereas second-level
agenda-setting refers to the importance of particular attributes that describe an issue (Agee, Ault
& Emery, 1991). As such, the mass media can influence not just what its audience thinks about
certain issues (first-level agenda-setting) but also in which ways the audience comprehends
certain social phenomena (second-level agenda-setting). Second-level agenda setting is more
relevant to the discussion of the BJP’s website, because through its website the BJP influences its
audience to think about issues on its political agenda in a certain way.
Second-level agenda setting has conceptual ties with framing: a process that involves
elites (e.g. political, media) shaping issue-debates by identifying the underlying problems within
certain social phenomena (Nelson, Oxley & Clawson, 1997). According to Entman (2003) the
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framing process consists of three elements: (a) defining the problem; (b) interpreting the
problem; and (c) morally evaluating the problem and/or recommending a solution to said
problem. This has importance in that how the media presents information may encourage its
audience to support certain politicians and their policies, by influencing how they think about an
issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007). In the framing process these elites create media frames.
Media frames serve as the end result of the framing process. They enable the elite to
define, evaluate, and proscribe a solution to the problem at hand that may influence the public’s
understanding of that issue (Entman, 1993; Matthes, 2011). For those reasons, some refer to
framing as a bridging concept because of its ability to connect elite’s interpretation of an issue to
public understanding (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
Frames’ effectiveness derives in-part from their ability to grant importance to a certain
idea (problem) and influencing how others think about that problem (Nelson et. al., 1997).
While frames do not necessarily provide new information about an issue they have the potential
to: (a) impact the mental recall of new beliefs about an issue; and (b) make certain beliefs more
salient (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Frames do not exist in a vacuum and they must struggle for
viability amidst the vast array of other interpretations of a social phenomenon. As such, those
frames that the public believes present the best rationale for a particular issue are considered
strong frames and so the job of the political and media elite would be to craft the understanding
of an issue that its audience considers the best (Matthes, 2011). In this way, the political and
media elite would have the ability to influence audience interpretations of an issue in such a way
that supports their reasoning.
According to Entman (2003) media frames have at least four locations: (a) the
communicator; (b) the text; (c) the receiver; and (d) the culture. In addition, the salience of a
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particular news frame is affected in-part by the credibility of the source providing that
information. As such, this thesis examines the communicator (e.g. BJP) and the texts used by the
BJP (e.g. Internet-published speeches and propaganda materials) in crafting its interpretation of
issues (media frames). Because the BJP’s website enables the political group to control the
dissemination of information to the public, this enables them to frame social phenomena. As a
result, they have the capability to influence what issues are discussed and how they are discussed
amongst the public.
The extent to which members of the public will be affected by the media’s agenda
depends upon an individual’s mental state and need for orientation (McCombs, 2006). Both the
relevance of an issue and the uncertainty present within an individual about that issue influence
the need for orientation (McCombs, 2006). For example, a person with a high level of
uncertainty about a relevant topic will have a high need for orientation; whereas an individual
with a low level of uncertainty about a very relevant topic will have a moderate need for
orientation (McCombs, 2006). In summary, even though the media does have an influence on
the public’s agenda, individuals’ current mental state mitigates this process.
While the Internet may enable political groups to engage with their audience in novel
ways by enabling them to more easily locate, communicate with, and mobilize their supporters,
evidence suggests that those individuals more likely to use the Internet as a source of political
information are those who are already politically engaged (Park & Choi, 2002). Therefore, while
the Internet may offer political parties new avenues through which they can engage their
audience, this medium may not necessarily revolutionize the way constituents engage with
politics. In fact, the Internet may help solidify divides already present because of the financial
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and technological hurdles (e.g. computer ownership) that must be overcome in order to access
information online (Kenski & Stroud, 2006).
While the Internet may not make citizens more politically active it does encourage them
to be so. It accomplishes this by making more information more accessible to more people (Park
& Choi, 2002). In addition, the Internet can facilitate community formation that is not bound by
more traditional borders such as time-zones or geography in that the information online can be
accessed virtually anytime, anywhere, and by anyone (Bimber, 1998). For these reasons—as
well as those mentioned in other sections of this thesis—it becomes clear why a group such as
the Bharatiya Janata Party would want to develop an online presence.
Having a website grants the BJP an unprecedented level of visibility on an international
scale—something that it could not have accomplished as easily without the use of Internet
technology. In addition, a website grants the BJP a greater amount of prestige and respectability.
Beyond those factors, the BJP’s website enables it to more easily encourage cohesive group
formation amongst its disparate supporters—those in India as well as abroad.
Hindutva on the Internet
Globalization destabilizes a firm understanding of individual and group identity because
it blurs the boundaries between socio-political entities: such as citizens and nation-states through
processes of migration (Scholte, 1996). As a reaction to the destabilization of identity and the
need of some members of the Asian Indian diaspora to define their identity within their countries
of migration, there develops a need to reassert an identity (Robinson, 2004). Hindu nationalist
groups stand ready to serve this need through offering information about what it means to be a
Hindu to those who need it. This process of self-definition serves as an important component of
group formation as it also enables an individual to align with people with whom she shares
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similar characteristics (Stets & Burke, 2000). Thus, due to the processes of globalization and the
destabilization of a firm identity, there emerges a need for self-definition. In addition, how
members of India’s diaspora choose to define themselves has the potential to be influenced by
the rhetoric published by Hindu nationalist groups online.
Aside from creating the conditions for groups to define themselves, globalization also
enables the means for identity construction amongst India’s diaspora. As a mechanism to spread
Hindutva ideology, the Internet serves as the perfect communication tool because it grants the
BJP unforeseen social and political prominence on a national and international scale by enabling
individuals across the globe to access its content and learn more about it (Kurien, 2004;
Rajagopal, 2000). In addition, the English-language dominance of the group’s website allows it
to reach its elite, middle-class supporters within India and abroad (Haynes, 1997; Kinnvall,
2004). These attributes work to further foster the maintenance of the Hindu nation.
The need to define a globally understood “Hindu-ness” typically results in the
construction of a homogenized and simplified version of the religion. The construction of a panHindu identity serves the needs of some members of the diaspora because having a codified
resource that they can turn to for their own (as well as their children’s) education on Hinduism
thus represents a valuable resource (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007). In light of changed social
circumstances due to migration, this desire for a simplified version of Hinduism enables groups
such as the BJP to construct a version of this religion that overlooks the inherent divisions (e.g.
caste) within Hinduism and construct a social framework that continues to promote the desires of
its traditionally upper-caste, middle-class support base (e.g. economic liberalization and social
order), while also incorporating members of subordinate groups (Fernandes & Heller, 2006).
The Internet serves as one of the ideal locations to spread the message of Hindutva to members
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of the diaspora because of its easy accessibility across the globe and simplified dissemination of
information. Thus, members of the Hindu diaspora can use sites created by Hindu nationalist
groups to maintain contact with one another, as well as keep abreast of any current events that
concern Hindus, India, or any other pertinent topic (Jaffrelot & Therwath, 2007).
The power dynamics inherent in the Internet as a global media tool indicate an overall
shift from members of India’s Hindu population being controlled by the images constructed of
them by the British crown to being able to construct their own self-image. Despite the rather
democratic character of the BJP’s use of the Internet, the power of identity construction still
primarily resides in the hands of the socially, politically, and economically elite—marginalizing
the discourse of subordinate groups. Thus, rather than constructing a new ideology of the Asian
Indian online, I would argue that the BJP’s website constructs, perpetuates, and maintains a
political image that caters to the hegemony of the upper-caste, middle-class.
Middle class hegemony and Internet Hindutva
Anotonio Gramsci first articulated the concept of hegemony and since its inception it has
gained salience in a wide range of disciplines including social and international relations (e.g.
Uberoi, 2008; White, 1987). The term hegemony describes the process through which members
of different groups within society negotiate the meaning-construction of their social reality
(Sturken & Cartwright, 2001). Hegemony serves as a form of social control that caters to the
needs of the elite within a capitalist society and operates via civil society by actively working to
gain the consent of individuals to influence their adoption of a particular understanding of the
social world (Femia, 1981; Sen, 1972). The Internet and other mass communication tools allow
for the wider spread of a group’s hegemonic message.
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The BJP constructs the socio-political world according to what they define as economic
and social ideals: economic liberalization and Hindu nationalism (Jost, Federico, & Napier,
2009; Knight, 2006). The Internet enables the spread of ideas to individuals across different
spatially bound territories and enables the BJP to construct and assert a hegemony of India’s
middle class that reaches people throughout the world. This thesis will discuss how the Internet
enables the BJP to construct an ideology that works to assert a global upper-caste, middle class
hegemony. Therefore, this thesis will explore the construction of the BJP’s political image
online and relate this idea to the hegemony of the middle class in India.
The next chapter of this thesis will discuss the methodology adopted to explore the
construction of the BJP’s online identity.
analysis, and any pertinent conclusions.

Subsequent chapters will present my findings,
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Chapter 3: Method
I conducted a longitudinal textual analysis of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s website
(www.bjp.org) to explore the group’s political message between the years May 2004 and May
2009. As a methodology, textual analysis allows researchers to analyze a given text while
focusing “on the underlying ideological and cultural assumptions of the text” (Furisch, 2009, p.
240). In other words, conducting textual analysis enabled me to conduct exploratory work, while
paying attention to the environment that allowed for its production without needing to be
concerned with making my work generalizable (Furisch, 2009).
While conducting textual analysis provided me with the benefit of allowing me to link the
text to its context, there exist several weaknesses of the method. Some suggest that researcher
bias may affect what texts are chosen and how they are analyzed (Mason, 1996). This could
potentially lead to the researcher not accounting for any nuances in the text and only providing
her audience with a one-sided, possibly inaccurate argument (Prior, 2008). Other researchers
believe that studying a phenomenon strictly based on its textual account provides a limited
understanding of the event and that textual analysis should only be used in conjunction with
other methodologies (Philo, 2007). All of the aforementioned issues concern the validity of
using textual analysis as a method for understanding the propagation of the BJP’s political
ideology, which will be addressed in a later section.
Textual analysis of websites
With traditional texts (e.g. books, articles) there exist clear boundaries of what constitutes
the text and how to read it (Mitra & Cohen, 1999). What makes online texts (e.g. websites)
different from their traditional brethren concerns their impermanence and the use of hyperlinks
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that allow a reader to navigate the site in a non-linear fashion (Coiro, 2003).

For the

aforementioned reasons, this places the impetus on what constitutes the beginning and end of the
text on the researcher. In order to determine which segments of www.bjp.org to analyze, I
considered what aspects of the website may yield the most valuable information about the BJP’s
political message from a reader’s perspective.
Sampling technique
When approaching a new topic of research or discovery, readers may have different
levels of prior knowledge. According to study results, prior knowledge does impact how a user
navigates a website. Individuals with high levels of prior knowledge navigate websites more
easily, and they tend to do so in a nonlinear fashion (Chen, Fan & Macredie, 2006; Mills, Paper,
Lawless & Kulikowich, 2002). I assumed that the fictitious reader navigating the BJP’s website
has some level of prior knowledge about the organization, because she must either know the
site’s URL or have interests in topics related to the BJP to have found its website. The
aforementioned characteristics ensure that the reader does not select links that disrupt her
learning strategy and increases the likelihood of her navigating the website in a linear fashion.
In addition to being concerned with the level of prior knowledge, researchers identified
three reading strategies that people engage in when using hypermedia texts for learning
purposes: coherence, interest, and default screen position (Salmeron, Kintsch & Kintsch, 2010).
A coherent reading strategy involves the selection of hypertexts that relate to the material
previously read, while an interest-based approach concerns a reader strictly choosing links that
interest her and choosing less interesting links later in the search process (Salmeron, Kintsch &
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Kintsch, 2010). The default screen position involves a reader clicking on the first hyperlink she
notices on the webpage (Salmeron, Kintsch & Kintsch, 2010).
I used the coherence and interest reading strategies in this study. I used the interest-based
strategy to initially determine which hyperlinks to pursue on the website’s mainframe-afterwards, adopting the coherence approach.

I constructed this fictitious reader as being

interested in the BJP’s overall ideology, especially between the timeframe May 2004 to May
2009—when it was not in a position of political dominance.
Sample
Based on my sampling technique, my sample consists of links attached to the hyperlinks
“About Us” and “Media Resources, Speeches” on www.bjp.org. Some of the materials related to
these hyperlinks have dates, while others do not. I first examined all dated and non-dated
material produced from May 2004 to May 2009. I chose this timeframe because May 2004
represents the first time in the 21st century that the BJP lost its political dominance to the
Congress Party.
Steven Wilkinson (2005) makes the argument that the Congress Party’s defeat of the BJP
may actually hide underlying weaknesses in the Congress Party’s ability to rally political support
and provided that the BJP capitalizes on these weaknesses, they may be successful in the next
election season.

Capitalizing on the Congress Party’s weaknesses may involve a more

aggressive communications campaign, as the BJP attempts to rally support. Thus, starting the
analysis of the site’s contents in May 2004 has the potential to yield more information than if I
were to conduct analysis of material on their site from earlier years. I continued analysis of the
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website through the May 2009 election season, because the BJP (again) lost this election to the
Congress Party.
As mentioned previously, the impermanence of material found on websites may pose
problems for researchers, as the material may change or be deleted. In order to counteract
experiencing such problems all information found on the BJP’s website beginning in May 2004
until May 2009 was saved as PDFs and printed out so that both an electronic and paper copy of
the forms exist.
Data analysis
Analysis of the data consisted of reading the texts in a systematic fashion. I first read all
dated and undated documents produced by the BJP between May 2004 and May 2009 that fell
under the categories of “About Us” and “Media Resources, Speeches”. I then performed a
thematic analysis of the data: conducting open-coding to find emergent themes (Schwandt,
2007).
After this initial reading, I then reevaluated the documents I uploaded from the website to
determine which articles I would use for further analysis. I chose to analyze 14 documents in the
“About Us” section that came under the following headings: BJP Philosophy, BJP History, and
BJP Constitution. From the “Media Resources, Speeches” section I chose 48 articles to analyze.
Because in the year 2004 between May and December only eight unique articles were published
by the BJP, I chose to only examine the first 8 unique articles provided for each year. This
would prevent any analysis from giving too much importance to one year and prevent any bias
on my part in regards to the type of articles selected for analysis.
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Thus, I analyzed 62 documents published by the BJP on its website www.bjp.org. I
began with material in the “About Us” section that provided a more general overview into the
BJP, its ideology, and its mission in India. I then analyzed the dated yearly material provided by
the “Speeches” sections.
Threats to validity
Conducting textual analysis of the information on the BJP’s website creates the
possibility of threats to validity. One of these threats includes researcher bias, which involves
both the researcher: (a) choosing a narrow set of texts that does not accurately reflect the BJP’s
political ideology; and (b) not having theoretical sensitivity to the texts and only analyzing them
with preset ideas regarding their significance and meaning (Mason, 1996). To counteract this, I
achieved communicative validity by discussing my findings with recognized experts in my area
of research (Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2006). In addition, I used thick descriptions when discussing
the findings of my research, clarified any bias through discussing my background as a researcher,
and presented any information that may contradict the themes of my research (Creswell, 2009).
Role of researcher
I approach this research as an African-American, female graduate student who has had
the opportunity to travel to the subcontinent on three separate occasions and live in the country’s
northwest region for more than a year. During my time in India I had the chance to observe the
political process first-hand and meet with a representative of the Bharatiya Janata Party. That
withstanding, I do not have a personal stake in the outcome of India’s elections or in the success
(or failure) of the BJP; however, I do have a general interest in the economic growth of India and
the mobilization of this country’s citizens around the globe. Thus, I am concerned outsider who
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has a different set of cultural and political values, whose life has only been superficially
impacted by the Bharatiya Janata Party.
I hope that by exploring the topic of the BJP and its online presence, I will provide better
understanding regarding the importance of global mass media (such as the Internet) to political
groups.
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Chapters 4: Results
The mainframe of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s website (www.bjp.org) takes its viewers
into a particular brand of Indian (Hindu) nationalism. The site’s color scheme of white, orange,
and green serves as its most noticeable aspect—primarily because these are also the colors of the
Indian flag. Thus, there can be no mistaking the national origins of this party or the group of
people it purports to serve. The BJP also leaves no question about the values it supports—
clearly listing these in a chart: good governance, cultural nationalism, development, antyodaya
(services to help the socially marginalized), and security (in order).
While clearly establishing itself as an Indian political party through its color-scheme and
value-chart, the BJP also provides links to detailed information about itself. For example, the
mainframe has links that provide more information about the BJP’s ideology, organizational
structure, and role in Indian politics. Links such as these serve a more informational purpose.
Aside from the information-sharing links, the website also has links that enable a
viewer’s greater involvement in the organization. For example, a www.bjp.org user may sign up
to become a member of the BJP’s website, donate money, or find more information via
Facebook, YouTube, or iTunes.
Both types of links provide users with an ability to gain more knowledge about the BJP
and be active in their support of this group’s cause. Thus, it appeals to both active and passive
site-users by providing them with access to a plethora of knowledge and ways to involve
themselves with the goings-on of this political group.
Amidst the wide-variety of material that may be gleaned from the website, this thesis
examined written documents produced by the BJP between 2004 and 2009. To be more specific,
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this paper analyzed 62 documents from the “About BJP,” and “Media Resources, Speeches,”
sections of the website. The following pages present my findings from my analysis according to
the first research question posed at the beginning of this thesis.
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Part I: About Us
This section of the BJP’s website discusses the group’s ideological framework (e.g.
Hindutva), its leadership, and its views on the West and religious minorities. This segment has
significance because it not only tells its site-users about the history of the organization but also
what social values the BJP promotes.
About BJP, BJP History. The BJP uses the BJP History section to discuss the origins of
the organization and its leadership.
Idealistic political group. The site begins to inform its users of the BJP’s history through
the “About Us” page. This segment of the website informs viewers of the BJP’s mission for
India, its ideology, and its principles. Therefore, a viewer will learn that the BJP “advocates” for
“welfare social social policies [duplication in text], self reliance, robust economic growth,
foreign policy driven by a nationalist agenda, and strong national defense” (About Us, About
BJP, p. 1). The BJP roots these policies in “India’s ancient culture and values,” which it believes
will “build up India as a strong and prosperous nation” (About Us, About BJP, p.1). In addition
to desiring India to be both a strong and prosperous nation, the BJP also “aims at establishing”
India as “a democratic state” committed to the “equality of opportunity and liberty of faith and
expression” (About Us, About BJP, p. 1). In other words, the BJP does not represent a political
party interested in putting the needs of Hindus over those of other religious communities; rather,
it is interested in creating a fair state that provides everyone with an ability to express their
identity.
The image crafted by them borders the ideal—as they construct an image of an inclusive
nation state that relies on the values of India’s past as it gains prosperity in the future.
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History of great leadership. This segment discusses the professional history of two
important men within the BJP—the first being Deendayal Upadhyaya. The webpage states that
he served as a “source of ideological guidance and moral inspiration for the BJP since its
inception” and “His treatise on Integral Humanism […] a critique of both communism and
capitalism provides an alternative perspective for political action […] consistent with the laws of
Creation and the universal needs of the human race” (Ideologue: Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya,
p.1). This statement serves manifold purpose. For instance, it places this man as one of the
leaders of the BJP and someone that crafted its current ideology. Aside from that it links him
with the idea of nation building as it refers to Upadhyaya’s work on Integral Humanism, which
serves as a rejection of both US capitalism and USSR communism. Thus, this represents
Upadhyaya’s attempt at creating a third ideological space that exists in complete distinction from
the two overarching ideas of communism and capitalism.
The webpage also constructs Upadhyaya as a scholar connected to both Hindu-religion
and India. The site refers to him as being from “the sacred region of Brig” and his father being
“a well-known astrologer” (Ideologue: Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya, p. 1). In addition they
describe the good fortune he had in school by stating that “he took a Government conducted
competitive examination in dhoti and kurta with a cap on his head, while other candidates wore
western suits” and “at this exam he topped the list of selectees” (Ideologue: Pandit Deendayal
Upadhyaya, p. 1). In other words, his success as a student involves his connection to India that
others around him allegedly rejected—as illustrated by their choosing to wear western (as
opposed to Indian) dress. Because his time studying for his BA and other higher degrees
coincides with his participation in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)—a paramilitary
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pro-Hindutva group—it may also be gleaned that his participation with groups such as the RSS
enabled his academic success.
The website next discusses Syama Prasad Mookerjee, whom they state served as the
founder of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh—the BJP’s political predecessor. The site constructs this
man as rejecting other socio-political movements that may damage the Indian nation. For
example, it states that “He became the opposition leader when Krishak Praja Party—Muslim
League coalition was in power” (Syama Prasad Mookerjee, p. 1). The Muslim League
represents one group that advocated for the partition of India and the construction of Pakistan—
an event that continues to disturb some members of the Hindu-right who typically advocate for
the maintenance of India’s geographical integrity.
Mookerjee would eventually work for inclusive, Hindu organizations. For example, after
leaving the Progressive Coalition Ministry, Mookerjee “emerged as a spokesman for Hindus and
joined the Hindu Mahasabha” where later “he became the President;” however “he wanted the
Hindu Mahasabha not to be restricted to Hindus alone” (Syama Prasad Mookerjee, p. 1). In
other words, through these organizations, Mookerjee hopes to work for the betterment of all
India. Thus, the site constructs him as a man who cares about Hindu issues but will also use his
faith—and the socio-political power afforded him because of it—to enhance the well-being of all
Indians.
This section connects the greatness of these two men to their work on behalf of India’s
Hindu community.
About BJP, BJP Philosophy, Hindutva. Here the BJP defines Hindutva by
simultaneously stating what this term means and contrasting it with what the term’s definition
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does not include. Thus, in this section the BJP constructs Hindus as a ‘hurt’ community, trying
to regain power after the detrimental effects of both Muslim and Christian leadership in the
country. In addition, the BJP portrays itself as a political party that aims to unite (and represent)
all of India’s diversity, which the Christian and Muslim religious minorities prevent and by
doing so impede the progress of the nation.
Hindutva and national unity. The BJP goes through great efforts to construct Hindutva
as a socio-political term and not a religious one. From the opening page of the Hindutva section,
a line reads “Hindutva is a nationalist, and not a religious or theocratic concept” (Hindutva,
2009, p.1). Instead “What Hindutva does is to remind its people of a common past in a common
civilization” (Give us this day, 2009, p. 3). The BJP believes that, “For a people and a nation to
rise to the highest, they must have a common memory of great heroes and exploits” (Give us this
day, 2009, p. 1). The BJP constructs the project of Hindutva as uniting all the people of India
because—through Hindutva—the BJP will be able to reconstruct a shared past for all people that
will result in India flourishing. Thus, they make the term Hindutva less potent by attempting to
remove the religious connotations of the term and place it in the realm of the political.
Christians and Muslims as a threat. On several occasions the BJP constructs both
Christians and Muslims as a threat to India’a development; however, when addressing how both
these communities negatively impact India, they do so through different means. For example, as
it concerns Christians the BJP claims that the term secularism serves as “a weapon by which the
evangelists […] have been pushing to the wall the plural tradition of our country, the tradition
founded in the basic world-view of Hinduism” (The Hindutva Judgments, 2009, p. 3). In other
words, the BJP believes that the idea of secularism enables Christian groups to attack the fabric
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of Indian society. In this example, it constructs Indian society as a Hindu society. Thus,
Christianity poses a threat to practitioners of Hinduism, and those who claim Indian citizenship.
The BJP also constructs Muslims as damaging to India’s progress. As an example of
this, the BJP sites the Babri Masjid case. The group asks readers to, “Imagine if the Muslim
leadership had agreed to shift the site and build a temple in Ayodhya. How much Hindu-Muslim
unity there would have been in India? India could then have used that goodwill to solve the
major religious, caste, and economic issues facing the country” (Hindutva: The Great
Nationalist Ideology, 2009, p. 3). The BJP places the blame for Hindu-Muslim animosity on
Muslims and claims that animosity led to India’s inability to solve its social problems. In other
words, Muslims hold responsibility for many of India’s continued social ills.
While the BJP construct both Christians and Muslims as dangerous to the social fabric of
India, it also creates a distinct hierarchy between them. A quote from the BJP states that “now in
the Christian West, the state and the society are largely powered by commerce and technology”
and that “While the Christian West has evolved dynamically over the past few centuries, the
story of Islam is one of 1500 year of unmitigated stagnation” (Semitic monotheism, 2009, p. 4).
So even though Christianity has the potential to harm Indian (Hindu) society, its position in the
BJP’s mythology places it above the perceived Muslim threat. At least there exists a reason to
respect the Christian West—it has the ability to change and develop—which the Muslim
countries allegedly lack.
Adding emphasis to this point the BJP claims that anyone within the Muslim community
that takes the first steps towards progress “was disposed of with such severity that it set an
example and a warning to anyone who would dare to cross the line” (Semitic monotheism, 2009,
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p. 4). Thus, not only do Islamic countries (people) fail to progress, they actively suppress any
attempts at doing so. These statements both reinforce the idea of Christian and Muslim
communities being a threat to the Indian nation, while also placing the Christian community
above the Muslim—portraying Muslims as the group that should be most despised.
Superior to the West. Part of the BJP’s message involves it claiming India to be superior
to the West. It does so by first claiming difference from monotheistic countries (read: countries
that practice either Christianity or Islam, and reside in the West) before asserting its superiority.
The BJP claims that in the West “the most important, and often the only, link between different
institutions of the society was the state,” whereas for India “the society or the group, at whatever
level it functioned, was the dominant reality and the state was a residual authority” (Semitic
Monotheism, 2009, p. 1). Through this, the BJP begins to make its claim for India being
different from the West. It claims that the West relies on the government to drive the functioning
of the state, whereas India does not. On this basis of difference, the BJP then begins to construct
its argument for India’s superiority.
The website also constructs members of the West as lacking self-control. For example it
states that societies from that part of the world “never knew how to live by self-regulation” and
they “never knew how to exist together” (Semitic Monotheism, 2009, p. 1). This ability to
regulate oneself contrasts with the self-regulating society of India, which serves as the basis of
the country’s “proud history of tolerance for other faiths and respect for diversity of spiritual
experience” (Hindutva: The Great, 2009, p. 1). The conflation of the West with monotheistic
religions (as previously discussed) helps inform the discussion of India’s alleged superiority to
the West. The BJP claims that an India built upon Hindu principles respects members of all
religions, while those who practice Christianity and Islam do not have this characteristic. Thus,
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the discussion of India’s superiority to the West helps cement the distrust of Christians and
Muslims.
Hindu hurt. Several times the articles in this section of the website portray Hindus as a
weak community that falls under the threat of others—particularly religious minorities. For
example, one article mentions the Babri Masjid. The BJP claims that the construction of a
temple at Ayodhya represents “the creation of a monument to a nation hero, a legend whose
fame and respect stretched outside of the borders of India […] even into Muslim Indonesia”
(Hindutva: The Great, 2009, p. 2). In other words, this temple represents something of great
importance to all people—not just Hindus. The site has importance for Muslims as well. Thus,
the BJP believes that Muslims not only hurt Hindus in their refusal to dismantle the Babri
Masjid, but also those of their own religion.
In reference to the Babri Masjid the article then states that Hindus “expected […] that
freedom from the political and economic chains of Great Britain would mean the systems and
symbols that had enslaved India […] would be obliterated” but “Hindus realized that their
freedom was yet to come” (Hindutva: The Great, 2009, p. 2). In other words, freedom here only
concerns Hindu-freedom and not the needs or rights of other communities. Aside from this, the
BJP constructs the mosque as a sign of not just Hindu’s—but India’s—continued enslavement
through the connection made between the destruction of the mosque and independence. Thus,
the BJP constructs Hindus as a community that suffers under the constant reminders of symbols
that allegedly oppress them. Only at the removal of these symbols of Hindu oppression will
India as a nation-state (not a particular religious sect) gain true freedom. This essentially serves
to create the Hindu community as a hurt majority that suffers under the power of a minority
religious community.
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About BJP, BJP Philosophy, Integral Humanism. Aside from Hindutva, the BJP
discusses another tenet of its ideology on its website: Integral Humanism. The group gives
credit for this term’s origination to a man they call Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya. According to
the website the history of this term dates back to a four-part lecture series given in April, 1965 in
Bombay (Integral Humanism). Through reading the lectures—broken down into four chapters
on the website—four themes emerge: critique of capitalism and communism, the troubled West,
integration of the individual and society, and national identity.
Capitalism and communism. According to the BJP both systems of government
leadership and economics have inherent flaws that cannot be modeled by India. The BJP
describes capitalism as an “economic structure” that “is not merely consumption oriented but is
clearly leading to destruction” before stating that the capitalist “economic system and system of
production are fast disturbing this equilibrium of nature” (Integral humanism, p.22). The BJP
constructs the western system of capitalism as a system that will eventually self-implode due to
its inability to maintain balance and self-correct.
In addition, the BJP believes that the capitalist system does not value all individuals
equally. They state that under the capitalist system “elimination of the weak is considered just
and natural” and so “the economic power accumulates in the hands of a few” (Integral
humanism, p. 25). Within the capitalist system only the economically elite will prevail, whereas
the poor will be eliminated and duly forgotten about. Thus, capitalism lacks genuine concern for
humankind and the betterment of all members of society.
Whereas the flaws with capitalism lie in its overproduction of goods and the inherent
elimination of the economically and politically weak, the problem with communism lies in its
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inability to allow the flourishing of individual talent and motivations. The BJP states that in the
communist system “The State is made supreme and sole authority in all matters. Individual
citizen is reduced to mere cog in this giant wheel” (Integral humanism, p. 25). Thus, the
communist system (like the capitalist one) does not work to serve the betterment of different
individuals; rather, it only exists to foster the needs of the state apparatuses and treats individuals
as needing to be “regulated by rigid rules, and incapable of any good unless directed” (Integrated
humanism, p. 26). In other words, the communist system does not grant agency to the individual
and slightly mistrusts its citizens as well—as seen through its need to construct rules and provide
directions.
Thus, through its critique of both the capitalist and communist systems, the BJP makes it
clear that they will not construct India as “an imitation of Russia or America” (Integral
humanism, p. 27).
The troubled West. While having managed to critique the two major economic systems
found in the western world, the BJP goes further in the construction of its image of the West as
troubled and incapable of providing leadership to India. One aspect of this argument begins with
the idea that the West lacks internal leadership. For example, the BJP claims that “It is itself
groping. Therefore simply to follow the West would be an instance of a blind being led by
another blind” (Integral humanism, p. 7). While the BJP acknowledges India’s need to change
its policies in order to have a prosperous future, the BJP claims that the US cannot lead India,
because it does not know what the future holds.
The BJP claims that the West’s lack of leadership capability stems from several sources.
For one, the BJP states that western ideologies “are not necessarily universal” and “that those

Atterberry 39

who claim to reform society by removing dead traditions, themselves fall prey to some outdated
foreign traditions” (Integral humanism, p. 6). The BJP levels this critique specifically at those
individuals who believe that India will achieve development and advancement through the
adoption of western ideas, because they lack universality and represent old traditions that no
longer serve a purpose. Thus, the idea of removing an old tradition based in India and replacing
it with a western tradition will not result in progress.
While the BJP makes claims as to why India should not look to the West for leadership,
at points it does concede that the value of some western ideas have merit. For example, the BJP
acknowledges that if “we can reconcile the various ideals of the western political thought then it
would be added advantages for us. These western principles are a product of revolution in
human thought, and social conflict. […] It is not proper to ignore them” (Integral humanism, p.
7). So after denigrating western thought, the BJP also acknowledges that it may have some merit
and inform their thinking about India’s development. Despite this acknowledgement, the BJP
does not grant western thought a privileged position. While western traditions and thought
should be taken into consideration, there exist constant reminders that the “thoughtless imitation
of the West must be scrupulously discarded” and the West “is itself at crossroads unable to
decide what is good” (Integrated humanism, p. 5).
Integration (of society and individual). While the West lacks the ability to help direct
India and the economic systems of both capitalism and communism remain flawed, the BJP
begins to construct an image for how it believes society should operate. At the core of this
image lies the idea of integration—the integrated individual and integrated society.
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The BJP states that integration has importance to society. It claims that “The first
characteristic of Bharatiya culture is that it looks upon life as an integrated whole. It has an
integrated view point” (Integrated humanism, p. 7). In other words, India [Bharat] sees life as
made up of many indivisible parts that adequately create the country’s society.
The idea of integration manifests itself via the individual—as well as society. As it
concerns the individual the BJP claims that it “thus considered the life of an individual in a
th[o]rough and integrated manner. We have set the aim of developing body, mind, intellect, as
well as soul in a balance way” (Integral humanism, p. 11). Thus, one of India’s social projects
involves care of the individual person and ensuring that that person develops with proper
attention being paid to said person’s physical, spiritual, and intellectual development.
The properly integrated person then may become a member of the properly integrated
society. The BJP expresses this idea by stating that “The individual comprising of body, mind,
intellect and soul as not limited to singular “I” but is also inseparably related to the plural “We””
(Integral humanism, p. 11). Thus, individuals live within a society that involves many different
aspects too—as the BJP claims “Society too has its body, mind, intellect, and soul” (Integral
humanism, p. 12). Thus, the society operates as an individual but on a much larger scale. Thus,
the various needs of society must be acknowledged and attended to for its proper functioning and
maintenance. So the BJP makes the argument that the key to a proper-functioning society lies in
treating society as integrated segments, not segregated parts.
Unity. The idea of integrated individuals living in an integrated society will inevitably
foster the idea and creation of a unified country that operates with minimal conflicts. The BJP
believes that the construction of a “national identity” for India has utmost importance because
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without it India “cannot recognize and develop all” its “potentialities” (Integral humanism, p. 3).
It then goes onto state that “The basic cause of the problems facing Bharat is the neglect of its
national identity” (Integral humanism, p. 3). Thus, in order to overcome the present ills
inflicting the nation, a national identity must be constructed. Through this, the potential of
Indians and India may be realized. So in the opinion of the BJP, the construction of a national
identity remains vital.
In conjunction with the idea of unity the BJP equates national unity with dharma (read: a
natural rule). It does so quite succinctly when it states that “National unity is our Dharma”
(Integral humanism, p. 20). As dharma, the idea of national unity includes all members of
society—from the very influential to the very weak. The concept of “Dharma is not necessarily
with the majority or with the people. Dharma is eternal” (Integral humanism, p. 20). Thus,
dharma exists above democracy and the opinion of the majority—it also seems to lack bounds in
terms of time and space (eternal). To drive home the significance of dharma (specifically
dharma as national unity) the BJP even makes the bold statement that “Actually God cannot act
contrary to Dharma. If he does, then he is not omnipotent” (Integral humanism, p. 18). The BJP
claims that if God cannot escape the bounds of dharma then neither can the common person.
Thus, all individuals must act according to dharma—especially as it concerns the project of
building national unity.
Aside from simply stating the importance of dharma, the text on integral humanism also
discusses the means necessary to achieve unity in India. They claim that unity for India will be
achieved via the maintenance of the poorest individuals via the availability of jobs and the
implementation of “suitable machines for Bhartiya conditions,” as well as a system of
governance that values the development of the individual (Integral humanism, p. 26). While the
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paper claims to discuss integral humanism, it does not clearly define the term—but the
aforementioned components of national unity may be read as foundation blocks of this concept.
Through this text, the BJP accomplishes both discrediting western forms of leadership
and economic systems, while offering a possible alternative. It does so in order to construct the
image of India as capable and self-efficient—with something to offer the world in terms of
cultural and leadership values.
About BJP, Constitution and Rules. The BJP dedicates one page on its website to a
discussion of the group’s organization. This section of the website serves the purpose of
informing interested individuals as to how the organization runs, how many members comprise
the group, and other day-to-day operations of the political party. While the BJP may use this
page on its website to discuss the operations of the political party, its ideology also becomes
apparent here too. The major theme reiterated in the discussion of its constitution and rules
concerns equality.
Equality. The BJP advocates for equality in terms of gender, class, and caste. They
repeat this theme when talking about the different components of the BJP’s hierarchy. As it
concerns caste and gender, they always make sure to state that women and/or members of the
scheduled castes or scheduled tribes will have representation by saying things such as “there
shall be at least 4 women and 1 SC/ST” (Constitution and rules, p. 4). Thus, the group
acknowledges gender and caste discrimination in positions of power and they actively work to
correct this social flaw.
The idea of promoting social equality comes across in another way, too. On its website
the BJP published a copy of its membership form. The person seeking membership must pledge
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that s/he does “not believe in discrimination based on caste, sex or religion” and does “not
observe or recognize untouchability in any shape or form” (Constitution and rules, p. 10). Thus,
the BJP once again attempts to construct an image of itself as a group that remains above all the
social qualms that divide individuals from different groups within society. They ask their
members also to value each person and to not discriminate against others on the basis of the
aforementioned characteristics. In this way, the party works to shape its own positive social
agenda centering upon a unified nation that does not let demographic differences divide its
people.
The BJP constructs itself as a political group that advocates on the behalf of Hindus,
while being inclusive of religious minorities. It also believes that India’s greatness—and the
greatness of the party—stems from its espousal of Hindutva. In the opinion of the BJP, India has
the potential to become an inclusive, united, nation that has its own identity distinct from the two
overarching ideologies of communism and capitalism.
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Part II: Media resources, Speeches.
Between May 2004 and May 2009, the BJP published 169 speeches on its website—with
the vast majority (99) being published in 2008. In the process of analyzing the BJP’s speeches, I
initially read all 169. After which I decided to limit my sample to the first 8 unique articles
published on its website for each year as the BJP only published 8 unique articles between May
and December 2004. I did this so that my analysis would not be biased in favor of any one year.
After conducting a second reading of these 48 articles, I organized my data thematically in order
to create a picture as to how the BJP constructs its political messages via speeches during this 6year time period.
Opposition
Congress Party
Congress leadership as incompetent. Despite the Congress Party (CP) winning the 2004
election—or perhaps because of it—the BJP actively makes the case for the CP’s incompetency
as political leaders. For example, they make the argument that the CP government does not
represent the needs of the people. They claim that “betrayal is acutely felt every time a common
man goes to the market to buy items of daily need, every time a housewife bring a new cylinder
of cooking gas, and every time a kisan [farmer] purchases diesel to run his pump” (Ranchi, 2004,
p. 6). In other words, because the BJP discusses such a wide variety of people, they make it
clear that the CP government’s policies may negatively impact the many people that come in
contact with them (e.g. all of India). This hyperbolic statement supports the idea that CP lacks
the necessary leadership skills to run India successfully.
CP and terrorism. As it concerns terrorism, the BJP describes the Congress Party as
weak and ineffective. In a discussion of Maoist violence the BJP claims that “The lack of a
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comprehensive, consistent, coordinated, and centre-led strategy is the biggest hurdle in India’s
fight against Maoist violence” (Speech by Shri L.K. Advani at National, 2007, p. 2). Because
the CP fails to appropriately utilize its role as the party at the center of national politics, it
enables terrorism to flourish. Thus, the BJP constructs an image of the CP as weak in terms of
fighting terrorism.
CP and communalism. According to the BJP the Congress Party represents a communal
organization through its willingness to help members of the minority population—specifically
Muslims. One quote states that “In July 2004, the newly elected Congress Government in
Andhra Pradesh announced its decision to introduce 5% reservation for Muslims in government
jobs and educational institutions” (Empowerment, 2007, p. 3). Thus, the CP willingly engages in
programs geared towards the benefit of the Muslim religious minority and even though this
measure “was struck down by the judiciary as unconstitutional” the CP “Nevertheless,” makes
“this promise […] in one form or another” (Empowerment, 2007, p. 3). In other words, the CPs
desire to help members from the Muslim religious community extends beyond any rational
means for aid to the point where it would threaten the decrees of Indian institutions (e.g.
judiciary) to advocate on behalf of this group.
Aside from simply granting the Muslim community seemingly unfair advantages, the BJP
also claim that the CPs treatment of this group puts India at risk because it enables terrorism to
flourish. For example, they site of the issue of Afzal Guru and state that the “UPA is sending out
wrong signals by adopting a soft attitude towards terrorism” and “the latest” example “being the
mishandling of the hanging of Afzal Guru, the main accused in the dastardly Parliament attack”
(Salient points from Former BJP President, 2007, p. 1). In other words, the BJP believes that the
CP fails at appropriately managing terrorism even when it has the chance to kill someone
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perceived to be guilty of harming India(ns). The BJP goes further to state why they believe the
CP acts in this way. They claim that “vote bank politics” dictate the actions of the CP (Salient
points from Former BJP President, 2007, p. 1). Alternately stated, the CP only wants the votes
of the Muslim religious minority; they “were never interested in their welfare” (Speech by Shri
L.K. Advani at mass chanting, 2007, p. 4). The attitude of the CP constructed for them by the
BJP makes it seem as if the CP both lacks the political power to effectively rule, but also that
their alleged concern for members of religious minority populations lacks merit. They present
this idea as strictly a superficial claim that the CP makes annually in order to be reelected.
CP and national unity. On occasion the BJP discusses the significance of national unity
and how the Congress Party does not enable national unity to grow within India. For example,
the BJP states that “Vande Mataram—is a patriotic eulogy of Mother India” and that their
“Congress and Communist friends, and also some fundamentalist Muslim organizations, raised
such a hue and cry over the singing of Vande Mataram” (Saundaryalahari, 2007, p. 4). Here the
BJP constructs this song as a representative of the nation. They also claim that the Congress
Party’s (CP) connection with Muslim-affiliated organizations prevented Indian citizens from
being able to display their national unity.
CP and India’s geographical integrity. In addition to putting the future of the nation at
peril through its alleged active role in maintaining socioeconomic divides, the Congress Party
also serves as a threat to India’s geographical integrity. The BJP accuses the CP of allowing
migrants from Bangladesh into the country. As a result, the BJP states that “many areas
bordering Bangladesh have been demographically altered by the illegal immigrants and reducing
the indigenous population to a minority, in the process thereby creating social tensions coupled
with serious security implications” (Rajnath, 2008, p. 16). In other words, the inability of the CP
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to protect India’s borders does not just result in a threat to India’s internal security, but also
serves to alter the social fabric of those areas of the country that share a border with Bangladesh.
Regarding J&K, the primary issue concerns the CPs inability to integrate this geographic
region into India definitively. The BJP claims that the CP started this problem during the early
days of independence and now everyone in the country knows “about the heavy price that India
is continuing to pay because of the non-resolution of” this issue (Jabalpur, 2008, p. 2). While the
CP may have started this problem, they fail to work in an adequate fashion to fix it, and rather
continue to “enhance separatist feelings” (Rajnath, 2009, p. 15). Thus, the CP represents a
political party—at least in the mind of the BJP—incapable of adequately maintaining the
geographic integrity of the nation.
Communist Party
Communists as unstable. The BJP also presents its leftist opponents as being relatively
unstable as it concerns their relationship with its coalition partners—the Congress Party. The
BJP states that a leftist leader “expressed his ‘disappointment’ over the performance of the
Manmohan Singh ministry in the first 100 days in office” and that “Now it is being reported that
the Left is satisfied with the performance of the government” (13 October, 2004, p. 1). The BJP
makes these statements before asking the question “So what is the Left’s stand?” (13 October,
2004, p. 1). The BJP makes the case for the leftists’ unwillingness to make one statement and
stick to it as indicative of their wavering tendencies. This may be extrapolated to mean that the
BJP believes that due to the Leftists’ wavering opinion of their coalition partners, then they
would also fail to make good political leaders for India. Thus, the BJP once again makes the
case that the leftists do not represent good leadership for India.
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Communists as poor representatives of India. While the BJP makes the case for the CPs
incompetence in positions of political leadership, it also makes the case for communists not
being true representatives of India. For example, they state that “For the Communists, Stalin’s
Soviet Union was their Socialist Fatherland, whose defence was more important than even the
independence of our own Motherland” (Rashtriya Suraksha, 2004, p. 2). According to the BJP
the Communists—the CPs alliance partners—do not represent India because they did not
actively work to secure India’s independence from the British. There also exists the idea that
their ideology has foreign origins, which further makes the case for its lack of alignment with
India’s needs.
Communists as not good for India. The BJP discusses communists in terms of them not
being beneficial to India’s development, while being supportive of reforms that help India’s
neighbors. For example, the BJP states that “if China has achieved impressive economic growth
over a sustained period, it is only because they implemented policy reforms, each of which the
communists in India have opposed and are continuing to oppose” (CII annual, 2005, p. 4). Thus,
the BJP cites that while India’s communists may be intellectually in-line with countries such as
China—they lack a willingness to implement the policies that have made China successful. The
BJP sees the communists’ position as follows: “It is okay if China becomes a nuclear weapon
nation, but India must not” (CII annual, 2005, p. 4). In other words, the Communists residing
within India do not value India’s development or national security; but rather, they place the
needs of foreign countries over their own.
Characteristics of the BJP
BJP as forward thinking. Whereas the CP and leftists represent incompetent forms of
leadership, the BJP represents a progressive party in need of change. Because the BJP lost the
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last election, many of their statements pertain to their need to reevaluate themselves and then
make changes in order to provide India with better leadership. For example, they state that they
have made “the decision to begin a Party-wide discussion, right from the central level down to
the mandal level, on the ‘TASKS AHEAD’ document” and that through this document they have
“identified a wide range of duties for strengthening the Party ideologically, politically, and
organizationally” (Ranchi, 2004, p. 9). In other words, the BJP understands that they need to
make changes to their party—in response to their recent loss—and they portray this need as
something that will impact the entire party organization. Aside from that, the idea of creating a
document about the execution of future tasks constructs this party as one concerned with its
future progress.
BJP as unique. The BJP continuously makes the argument for its difference in
comparison to other political organizations. For example, in one document it states that “At a
time when most of the political parties in the country have been reduced to the position of
personal fiefs of a few leaders, BJP stands apart as a party which passes through a process of
natural evolution and developments in the organization” (Presidential address Rajnath, 2006, p.
1). In other words the BJP’s difference stems from its ability to naturally evolve, which also
enables it to make dramatic changes to India’s political scene. The group also claims to stand
apart from other political parties because of its ability to work and change as an organization,
which stands in contrast with the idea of their political competitors as being more concerned with
personal power and prestige.
BJP as revolutionary party. In talking about their revolutionary character, the BJP also
cites how they changed Indian democracy. They state that “the BJP has succeeded in
demolishing the one-party supremacy of the Congress and transforming Indian polity into a bi-
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polar formation” (Presidential remarks, 2005, p. 2). In other words, the BJP represents the only
political party able to fundamentally change Indian democracy in a positive way.
Coherent leadership. The BJP creates the idea of having consistent leadership amongst
all levels of Party leadership. For example, they state that they expect “its leaders and
karyakartas at all levels to conduct themselves with honour, restraint and dignity” (BJP national
council, 2004, p. 5). In other words, the BJP has an established code of conduct under which all
individuals within the Party must follow. This creates the idea of there being a coherent
leadership culture amongst the group.
Party with integrity. Part of the BJP’s claim to uniqueness involves it perpetuating the
idea of the party representing an ideologically united group of individuals who work on behalf of
fulfilling a joint mission. They claim that “There can be no scope for […] negativity within the
organization” and that “expeditious steps should be taken to address internal dissensions,
factionalism, etc., for which there can be simply no place in” their political party (National
council, 2008, p. 3). In other words, the BJP does not condone differences of opinion within
their organization. They make this claim by stating that they will actively take steps to quell any
form of dissent that arises within the organization. One reason the BJP may take such active
steps to quell dissent may be that they view the “atmosphere of unity, fervor and selfconfidence” as the “hallmark of the BJP” (National council, 2008, p. 1). Thus, the party strives
to maintain an integral identity.
Commitment to growth. The BJP believes that in order to excel, the Indian economy
must continue to grow. They claim that during their rule from 1998 to 2004, “The rapid pace of
development was set in motion” but now due to the CP being in power, their “prestigious
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developmental projects have been put on the back burner” (National executive meeting, 2006, p.
8). In other words, while constructing the CP as a group not concerned with India’s growth, they
construct themselves as a group that puts the idea of India’s growth at the forefront of their
concerns.
Inclusive party. The BJP’s vision of India’s future includes the idea of India being
accepting of people from many different social backgrounds. The BJP claims to have “a proud
record of having the largest number of MPs from Dalit and tribal communities” (BJP national
council, 2004, p. 9). Their willingness to count members from marginalized segments of society
amongst their political roster shows that the party has a strong commitment towards the
construction of a unified national image. Meanwhile, at the same time that they claim to work
for a unified India, they express reluctance as it concerns to the needs of lower-caste individuals.
They express this by stating that “caste-based politics is not good for democracy, nor is it in the
national interest” (Mumbai Venkaiah Naidu, 2004, p. 10). The BJP’s reason for not engaging
with caste-based politics involves their concern over the “promotion of individual leaders, their
families and vested interests” (Mumbai Venkaiah Naidu, 2004, p. 10). The BJP makes the
argument that in order to ensure the inclusiveness of India they cannot engage with caste-politics
as those will only serve the special interests of a few. Thus, the BJP subsumes all things under
the top priority of building an inclusive nation that does not appeal to the special needs of any
group—even if that group may be one that needs help.
Guardians of history. While advocating for the development of an integrated India, the
BJP also pays homage to its past and recognizes the importance of protecting it. As it concerns
the 1977 Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi, the BJP states that “Young Indians should know
who did it. They should know why it was done. And how it was done. They should also know
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who resisted this strangulation of democracy. And why. And how” (Function to commemorate,
2006, p. 4). The BJP believe that the young people of India “are not told about this dark spot in
the life of Free India,” which puts them in a position to lead the country towards making the
same mistake again (Function to commemorate, 2006, p. 4). Thus, the BJP advocates for the
proper telling of history—which (in this situation) conveniently places them in the position of
national hero.
Advocates of responsible foreign policy. While claiming to be the exemplars of
responsible leadership within India, the BJP also constructs an image for itself as trying to extend
this form of leadership abroad. As it concerns the security situation in Nepal (a neighboring
country), the BJP states that the “UPA government” is “responsible for the present complicated
situation in Nepal because this government failed to take any meaningful and constructive
initiative on the issue” of Maoism “in time” (National executive meeting, 2006, p. 3). The BJP
points to the errors of the present-reigning political organization and states that it should have
wielded its political energy in Nepal in order to prevent the powers of terrorists from badly
impacting the country (and possibly India as well, since the subcontinent does experience
problems due to this group). Thus, the BJP claims that with their opponents in command, India
fails to create a constructive foreign policy that would reduce the terrorist threat in the region.
Representatives of Hindutva. The BJP consistently position themselves as the
protectors of Hindu people and Hinduism. The BJP makes a bold statement that “if anybody
tries to take the cover of secularism to indulge in anti-Hindu politics and statecraft, the BJP will
stand in their path like a rock, prepared to make any sacrifices” (Ranchi, 2004, p.5). If one were
to forget the BJP represents a Hindu nationalist organization, then the party ensures that they
have a reminder for said people. They refer indirectly to their main opposition—the CP—when
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they bring up the issue of secularism. By doing so, they also make the argument that the CP does
have an anti-Hindu stance and that those of the Hindu faith will not find protection amongst CP
leadership. Thus, the BJP create an image for themselves as the only representatives—if not
defenders—of Hinduism.
BJP’s importance to India
National security. In reference to national security, the BJP specifically talks about the
history of nuclear energy in the country—especially in regards to the Pokhran II tests that it
conducted in 1998. As it concerns national security the BJP states that they initiated these tests
in order to “safeguard” India’s “national interest […] and to reject the notion that it is the
security of only some in the world that was important and all others were irrelevant” (Pokhran,
2005, p. 2). In other words, the BJP needed to conduct those tests because it was important to
the Indian nation that they make a statement to others (read: other countries) that India’s national
security has importance. Therefore the BJP “had to boldly and resolutely assert the autonomy
of” their “decision making” (Pokhran, 2005, p. 2). In other words, the BJP felt that they did not
have another option regarding a nuclear weapons test and in the interest of the nation they had to
act alone.
Will lead India to prosperity. According to the BJP, under their leadership the
“government had opened the doors for all round development of the country,” which led to “The
prestige of India” increasing “in the world” (Parliament annexe, 2008, p. 3). While they no
longer form the government at the center, the BJP makes the claim that “If the people give” them
another opportunity to govern, then” they “will effectively establish India’s rise before the entire
country and the rest of the world” (Rajnath, 2008, p. 6). Thus, the BJP claim that having them at
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the country’s political helm will lead to India’s growth in prosperity and prestige as they begin to
wield power in world affairs.
BJP and equality. The BJP advocates fair treatment of all members of society including
members of religious communities, women, youth, and those belonging to scheduled castes and
tribes (SC/ST). They repeatedly make claims such as wanting “to see the progress and
empowerment of every Indian, irrespective of the caste or community or region they belong to”
(Empowerment, 2007, p. 2). This quote creates the idea that the BJP represents an inclusive
polity that it will nurture in order for India to experience success.
In regards to youth, the BJP envision them as the future of India and thus they state that
they “need to better utilize their energy” and “make them use their abilities” (Parliament annexe,
2007, p. 6). They also go so far as to refer to youth as “the nation’s biggest reservoir of energy”
and “the base of” the BJP’s “organization” (Parliament annexe, 2007, p. 6). Thus, the BJP
recognize this relatively neglected population with hopes of crafting its energy into something
productive for the nation.
While the BJP propounds the idea of inclusivity, they do take this idea too far—
especially as it concerns members of religious minority groups. For example, the BJP at one
point states that “The party is committed to provide reservation for the SCs, STc, and OBCs in
minority institutions, which is currently denied” (Parliament annexe, 2007, p.7). In this example,
the term minority refers to religious minorities—such as the Christian and Muslim communities
in India. In their quest to seek equality, the BJP fails to acknowledge the importance of some
special interest groups’ decisions to set up organizations that advocate upon the behalf of certain
segments of India’s population.
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Promoters of India’s cultural heritage. While the BJP holds organizational integrity as
an important characteristic of their organization, they also value the protection of India’s cultural
heritage. The BJP states that “India’s democratic tradition and” its “approach to conflictresolution […] have been fundamentally influenced by Hindu philosophy and cultural ethos”
(Democracy and conflict, 2008, p. 5). Thus, the BJP explicitly derives a connection between
democracy, conflict-resolution, and Hinduism, which means that the BJP fundamentally
represents values grounded in Hinduism. Thus, through their political work, the BJP promotes
Hindu-based values.
The idea of protecting India’s cultural heritage also extends into language politics. In a
speech by Advani, he claims that in regards to “Hindi,” which is a “national language” he is
“immensely proud,” while at the same time “dismayed by the fact that Hindi has not yet received
the kind of recognition, both within India and internationally, that it so richly deserves”
(Democracy and conflict, 2008, p. 1). The overall statement attests to the BJP’s activist-like role
in ensuring that they discuss those things viewed as vital to India’s cultural heritage are brought
to the forefront of discussions. This includes at least granting lip-service to the idea of
promoting Hindi throughout India and the world.
BJP and national identity/unity. The BJP claims to advocate for a national identity and
to accomplish this via building national unity. This sense of national unity and national identity
will lead to India’s prosperity. For example, in their discussion of the beginning of Tata Steel,
the BJP states that its founder “was encouraged by many patriotic Indians” (Speech by L.K.
Advani FICCI, 2007, p. 2). Thus, those people who enact a form of pride that stems from the
nation encouraged what would eventually become one of the largest companies in India.
Therefore, the BJP constructs the idea that India’s success stems not only from the great minds
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that live within the country, but also through those individuals who connect their efforts to the
nation-state.
India’s future. The BJP constantly stresses its concern with India’s future, whether that
is through the promotion of policies related to economic development, youth, or other reforms
necessary for maintaining India’s vibrancy. In regards to India’s relatively young population, the
BJP states that, “when job losses have become widespread due to economic recession, the
greatest concern of young India is employment” therefore, the BJP’s “economic policy must […]
ensure productive employment to every able-bodied individual” (Advani On National Youth
Day, 2009, p. 4). The BJP places an emphasis on the opportunities available to young people in
this country throughout the documents it produced during its 2009 campaign. They present this
emphasis on India’s youth population by emphasizing the concerns that this population may face
in the future. The BJP seeks to ensure that youth will have a good future in India because they
believe that there exists a relationship between a healthy future for India and the country’s youth.
As it concerns India’s economic development, the BJP stresses the importance of creating
an Indian model of development and political leadership. They state that they “will have to think
of a new model for India which imitates neither the USSR nor the US, so that while India
develops, it also shows to the world the path of development” and “By explaining the ideas of
Gandhi in accordance with the current age, the economists can present [an] Indian economic
model of development before the world” (Presidential speech Singh, 2009, p. 8). The BJP cites
both the US and USSR because of their opposing, but highly popular forms of social and
economic development—the former being a capitalist country and the latter being a communist
country. The BJP hopes to construct a new form of economic development that does not strictly
follow either of these two ideologies. In that way they will be able to educate the world in how
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to develop. Thus, the future of India according to the BJP involves harvesting memories of their
past and utilizing them to promote India’s economic and political leadership within the world.
And last, the BJP explicitly mentions the need to reform India’s education system. They
discuss the need to educate more of its youth and to better equip teachers for the classroom.
They claim that “Teacher training, teacher welfare and social security for teachers will receive
never-seen-before commitment” (Advaniji’s speech Gujarat, 2009, p. 4). The BJP plans to take
this and other measures in order “to attract the best talent for teaching profession,” which will
hopefully improve “the condition of […] children,” who the BJP belief “are” their “greatest
asset” (Advaniji’s speech Gujarat, 2009, p. 4). Thus, the BJP emphasizes the need to attract
better teachers to the profession in order to ensure that Indian children receive a high-quality
education, because how they perform inside (and then outside) of the classroom has importance
in shaping India’s future.
BJP and the common person
Work on behalf of the people. The BJP claims to not put their interests ahead of the
nation. For example, they say that “We have taken the pledge of continuously dedicating
ourselves in the service of Bharat Mata with or without power” (Parliament annexe, 2008, p. 9).
Thus, they state to not work for their own political (or other) ambitions, but rather to serve the
nation (e.g. Bharat Mata). The BJP further clarifies what they mean in terms of service to the
nation by identifying groups in need of their help: farmers, the common person, and women.
Concern for farmer. The BJP makes the claim that the CP ignores the welfare of
farmers—leading to the ultimate downfall of the agricultural sector of the economy. The BJP
claims that “The entire country was ashamed to witness incidents of the food providers
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committing suicides. […] If the neglect of agriculture and farmer is not immediately halted, the
pace of development in the country will get arrested” (Presidential speech Singh, 2009, p. 6).
The BJP cites two important things in this example: farmers’ suicides and India’s development.
They link the two through Congress’ neglect of both. This linkage enables the viewer to see a
connection between India’s lack of development and the deaths of farmers. The BJP therefore
successfully places these two social ills under the jurisdiction of the CPs leadership (or lack
thereof ).
Create awareness amongst the common person. The BJP continuously stresses its
desire to be a party that advocates on behalf of the common person. This feeds into their desire
to build a strong and cohesive nation. As such they advocate for members within the party to
“Go among the people and explain to them the governments’ achievements” (National council,
2008, p. 3). By doing so the BJP hopes to create awareness about their initiatives and successes
amongst all levels of the party establishment, so that they may better present these ideas to the
common people. Again in their effort to create awareness about their political ambitions
amongst the general public, they advocate that their “Chief Ministers should emphasize on the
issues that bring the common people nearer to them and they are made aware of the
government’s work” (Parliament annexe, 2008, p. 4). Again, the BJP’s emphasis remains not
solely on working on behalf of the common person, but also broadcasting what they have
accomplished for this demographic.
Importance of women. In an effort to promote the idea of gender equity, the BJP
discusses the role of women and the positive impact that they can have within the Party and the
nation. The BJP begins by stating that “If Indian culture has survived and thrived all the twists
and turns of history, it is because of the Indian Woman” (Mahila Morcha, 2004, p. 1). As a
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group that claims to represent Indian culture, the fact that they give such credence to women as
the group that has enabled Indian culture to survive means that they believe (or will at least grant
lip-service to the idea) that women play an important role within the nation. As such, the BJP
plans to create an “environment free from injustice and violence in the public as well as the
private sphere,” in hopes that they can enable “women to contribute to every walk of life”
(Mahila morcha, 2004, p. 2). Thus, part of the BJP’s plan to create a better India involves the
equal participation of women in society. They plan to actively ensure that this happens through
creating a woman-friendly social environment.
BJP as the correct choice.
Better than CP. Often times the BJP makes comments aimed directly at their primary
electoral competitor: the Congress Party (CP). They do this in order to show the ways in which
the CP lacks in its leadership capabilities, while simultaneously displaying their strengths. For
example, in one statement the BJP claims that “There is not a single corner in the country where
terrorist attacks have not taken place. Terrorists kept challenging the establishment of the
country. […] But the UPA government kept turning a deaf ear towards this” (Presidential Speech
Singh, 2009, p. 3). The BJP makes this statement to illustrate how the CP not only fails to
adequately handle India’s problems, but blatantly ignores them as well. In contrast the BJP
states that “The BJP never played politics on the issues of terrorism. The NDA enacted POTA to
facilitate capturing terrorists and to easily bring them to book” (Presidential Speech Singh, 2009,
p. 3). In other words, while the CP will ignore the issue of terrorism in India, the BJP—through
its alliance in NDA—has repeatedly taken steps to ensure that one of India’s largest problems
may be resolved in an efficient manner through the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). By
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stating this, the BJP constructs their leadership as capable in contrast with the seemingly less
competent CP.
In another example, the BJP discusses the construction of three states under its
leadership. They claim that “When we formed three new states in 2000—Chhattisgar,
Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand—we ensured that this was done smoothly. This had never happened
when the Congress formed new states in the past” (Salient points Advani, 2009, p. 4). The BJP
directly contrasts its accomplishments with those of the Congress in order to make it more
apparent to the audience that they offer a responsible form of leadership, which greatly contrasts
that which they could receive from the CP.
Assured of victory. The BJP’s overall message may be summed up according to one
word: victory. They make statements such as “the manner in which the BJP is achieving
important electoral successes one after the other, clearly indicates that the people’s support for
the UPA government is melting in favour of the BJP” (Rajnath, 2008, p. 1). The UPA
government, headed by the CP, represents the BJP’s greatest political enemies; provided that the
CP no longer has popular support, then the BJP will be assured of victory. Not only will the BJP
be assured of victory because of the CPs allegedly waning popular appeal, but also because their
opponent’s support base will be transferred to them.
Summary
According to the BJP, they represent the only correct form of leadership for India. They
have a strong stance on national security, development, and national integrity, while also making
a pledge to work for a unified nation, concerned with the development of all its citizens. The
BJP’s belief in Hindutva enables it to accomplish these goals as they believe that India will only
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be able to reach its potential provided that it looks to its Hindu history, which the BJP states that
only it can construct.
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Chapter 5: Discussion
Organizations within India’s Hindu nationalist movement understood the importance of
constructing a global identity for the Hindu population relatively early. For example, the Vishva
Hindu Parishad (VHP)—the global cultural component of the RSS—formed in the 1960s
according to the following mission statement: (a) to consolidate and strengthen Hindu society;
(b) to promote and protect Hindu values; and (c) to help organize Hindus abroad as a means to
protect their Hindutva (Robinson, 2004). The VHP aims to construct a global, homogenous
understanding of Hinduism that enables Hindus from disparate sections of the world to connect
based on a shared identity—an idea that fits well with the Hindu Right’s desire to eliminate
barriers such as caste, locality, and socio-economic status in its construction of a Hindu-nation
both within and outside of India (Mukta, 2005).
The importance of reaching the global Hindu community has not been lost on the
political arm of the RSS: the BJP. The BJP formed after the dissolution of the Janata Party in
April 1980. This group then rose to power during the early 1990s by adopting a proliberalization stance and catering to the dictates of India’s emerging new middle class identity
(Fernandes, 2006). In 1998 the BJP won its first national election and was granted the ability to
form the government at the center. This same year marks the year the BJP became the first
political party within India to operate a party website (Karan, 2009).
BJP & framing
The BJP’s use of the Internet has significance because it grants them the power to frame
issues of (primarily) local significance on a global scale. Joseph Nye (2011) discusses the term
soft power in his text The Future of Power. One aspect of soft power concerns the ability to
shape the terms of the discussion, possibly before it begins (2011). The BJP’s use of the Internet
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could be seen as an exercise of their soft power through the online publication of their
interpretation of significant events in India. A successful use of their soft power would enable
the BJP to discuss events of significance to them in terms that highlight the group’s best
attributes and thus attract a larger number of supporters.
For example, through publishing their ideas on a globalized mass medium the BJP
effectively shapes (frames) the context of understanding their political rivals (e.g. Congress Party
and Communists). This may then influence how others interpret the BJP’s political rivals, as
well as impact the way in which these groups engage with the public. While studies would need
to be done to test this hypothesis and examine the extent of the BJP’s ability to set the news
media’s and public’s agenda, it should be noted that the presence of the BJP’s website on the
Internet does not prevent its rivals from also developing an online presence of their own—which
the Congress Party has done. So, the BJP’s website should be thought of as existing within an
on-going communications network where it rivals others for attention, prominence, and
ultimately the ability to set the agenda on important events related to the Party and India.
As an example of how the Internet enables the BJP to engage in framing, I will discuss
the group’s history of violence. As mentioned in this documents introduction, the BJP has
become known for inflaming religion-based violence—with one of the more recent examples
being the 2002 riots in Gujarat. While many may know of this group’s history of religion-based
violence, there fails to be any mention of this on the group’s website. Thus, through the decided
failure to include information about its own violent history the BJP frames their political identity
as relatively non-violent with a penchant for inclusiveness. This may have further ramifications
in regards to agenda-setting and how members of other elite organizations (e.g. news media) and
the general public discuss the BJP.
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BJP & identity formation
Because of its relatively wide reach, the Internet has the potential to shape identities,
reshape the structures of power and inequality, and establish new forms of social organization
(DiMaggio et. al., 2001). Within a globalizing world, the Internet’s potential to shape identities
takes on added significance because it enables the decoupling of identity formation from a
specific territorial location (DiMaggio et al, 2001). The Internet also enables members of the
diaspora to remain connected to one another. Because of its ability to be accessed by anyone
from virtually anywhere, the Internet enables members from the disparate Hindu diaspora to
access information that can further connect them to India. However, the point to be made does
not concern how members of the Hindu diaspora use the Internet to connect with one another and
the subcontinent, but rather why.
Some of the new possibilities afforded by an immigrant’s country of migration may
conflict with the values learned in said person’s country of origin (Mitra, 2005). According to
Ananda Mitra (2005) the differences between the socio-cultural norms of an immigrant’s country
of migration and country of origin may result in stress as an immigrant negotiates her identity in
her new place of residence. This tension, coupled with a lack of public information regarding a
person’s home country and cultural heritage may result in immigrants seeking alternative media
through which to remain connected to their country of origin. Because of this, the BJP harnesses
the power of the Internet as a means to present its own interpretation of social reality through its
appeal to a monolithic Hindu community that stretches across many disparate locales and gives
political expression to those who see themselves as members of India’s Hindu nationalist
movement (Robinson, 2004; Scholte, 1996).
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Myth construction
The appeal to this monolithic Hindu-nation over the Internet represents a form of cultural
myth construction. Myths operate on multiple levels. The primary level of myth construction
contains the factual elements (e.g. time), while the secondary level actively engages in meaning
construction (Trifonas, 2001). Myths utilize both levels of meaning construction in order to
naturalize elements of culture into common sense (Trifonas, 2001).
Myth construction relates closely with an understanding of ideology. Ideology represents
a form of cultural interpretation contingent upon myth construction, because it serves as a way to
make sense of the world via arbitrary meaning-making (Trifonas, 2001). The Internet enables
the process of ideological social construction and meaning-making to take place void of any
referent to social reality (Trifonas, 2001). This has important implications when it comes to
understanding the significance of a Hindu-nationalist ideology and the subsequent adoption of a
Hindu-nationalist identity.
The diaspora’s status as geographical outsiders understandably complicates the process of
translating and presenting an indigenous interpretation of India (Bhabha, 1994). With no firsthand referent to the social conditions within India, the significance of a social mediator becomes
that much more important. The Internet enables members of India’s diaspora to access rhetoric
constructed by Hindu-nationalist groups such as the Bharatiya Janata Party that present an
interpretation of national and international phenomena through a very specific ideological lens.
Hindutva represents the lens of interpretation used by the BJP. As an ideology, Hindutva
promotes the supremacy of Hindu culture and the need for group unity as a means for Hindus to
defend themselves against outside threats (Wirsing & Mukherjee, 1995). As a Hindutva
organization, the contents of the BJP’s website work to support this ideology by presenting
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factual events and their interpretations in an easily understood format. This presentation of preinterpreted material serves as a way to construct, translate, and naturalize meaning within an
ideological structure that actively supports the status quo by discouraging audience reflexivity
(Trifonas, 2001).
In addition to discouraging audience reflexivity, the BJP’s use of the Internet discourages
certain members from even being part of its audience. For example, by choosing to use the
Internet as the device to relay their message, the BJP prevents those who lack the financial
means to access a computer and use the Internet from being privy to their ideas. This also
prevents those who lack the knowledge of how to navigate a website from accessing the
information that can be found online. In addition, if an individual knows how to use a website
but does not know either English or Hindi, then that individual cannot access the content of the
site. Thus, through their website the BJP carefully crafts its message towards a specific group of
people, which are those of the means to have access to the Internet and have knowledge of either
Hindi or English.
Even for those who have the ability to navigate the site, they have limited ways of
interacting with it. The website does not have a forum in which site-users can chat or reflect
about the information found on the site and so, the BJP presents its information in a one-way
fashion from sender to receiver. As seen throughout the results section, the BJP’s ideology
works to support an image of India as a Hindu-nation and their legitimacy as India’s rightful
leaders. As it concerns the United States, the BJP (and other Hindu nationalist groups) receives a
good deal of financial support from those well-off members of the Hindu Indian Asian diaspora
(Chopra, 2006). This creates a back-and-forth mechanism of mutual support where BJP
supporters exchange dollars (or rupees) for pro-Hindutva messages.
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Because of the material support provided by members of India’s national and
international Hindu populations to the Hindutva movement—this creates the need for the BJP to
espouse an ideology that reflects the needs of its audience. Upper-caste, middle-class Hindus
comprise the BJP’s traditional support base and so it is not surprising that an appeal to traditional
middle-class sensibilities may be ascertained from this website. Not only that, but through its
website the BJP constructs a hegemony of upper-caste, middle-class ways of understanding their
world. They do so by advocating for a conservative social structure, while also promoting a
liberalized development strategy. In other words, through its website the BJP constructs an
ideology geared towards the desires of members of India’s middle-class.
Ideology becomes hegemonic through the process of negotiation by which members of a
dominant group gain and exercise intellectual and moral leadership over those deemed
subordinate to them (Fermia, 1981). The users of the BJP’s website have the role of intellectual
and moral leadership thrust upon them in that not everyone has access to the information found
on this webpage. Therefore site-users exercise a form of intellectual and moral leadership
through the de facto exclusion of those who lack the ability to adequately operate computer and
Internet technology, as well as understand the messages posted on www.bjp.org. Thus, the
messages presented on the website have the potential to only be shared amongst a select group of
individuals.
As noted in the Literature Review, the BJP’s derived its initial support from India’s
middle-class, upper-caste members through their vocal support of liberalized economic policies
and conservative social policies. In more recent (post-2004) elections, the BJP has had to
recognize lower-caste groups through their support of candidates from those castes and even
though they grant lip-service to the idea of lower-caste empowerment, essentially their message

Atterberry 68

still appeals to the same ideals of their more traditional audience—only now, the BJP
incorporates lower-caste individuals (and women) into the dream of what was seen previously as
distinctly upper-caste, middle-class desires. The salience of the BJP’s messages (online and
otherwise) and the hegemony of the BJP’s pro-middle class ideology becomes most apparent
through the pro-BJP voting practices of some members of economically and religiously
marginalized groups (Engineer, 2000; Gupta, 2005)
The hegemonic quality of the BJP’s pro-middle class stance has greater implications
when seen in reference to the group’s desire for India’s assent to the world’s stage.
Globalization, economic liberalization, and mass communication present the BJP with an
unprecedented variety of ways to share its ideology with people from around the world. Given
the fact that the Internet enables the BJP to construct an image of India for those who may not
have a first-hand referent to this country, this enables the BJP to construct an image of India
according to their perception. Thus, the BJP may use the Internet as a cultural filter as it
concerns outsiders’ perceptions of the nation-state.
While the BJP may be in the cusps of figuring out how to reconcile the differences
between its traditional support of upper-caste, middle-class values (especially in the Hindi belt)
with the ascent of the increasingly vocal lower-castes, examining the messages propounded by
the BJP has importance (Jaffrelot, 2008). The messages presented by the BJP may inevitably
influence outsiders to believe the messages propagated by the BJP’s myth-production machines
and possibly support an organization that may not necessarily act in the best interests of the
majority of its national constituency.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
It cannot be overlooked that in the same year that the BJP won the chance to form the
central government for a full term, they also performed India’s second nuclear missile test—
Pokhran II—which launched them onto the global stage and into the comity of nuclear powers.
In this same year (1998) the BJP decided to launch their official online presence. Given the
ability of the Internet to be accessed wherever there lay the proper cable connection, then the
launch of the BJP’s website may be seen as an extension of their aim to craft out a place and an
image for India’s social and political ascension. For those reasons, studying how the BJP chooses
to define both itself and India has importance, because the ideas presented by the BJP online
have the ability to impact how Indians (those living in the country of India and abroad) view
themselves in relation to others, as well as influence how others view India.
This thesis highlighted the growing significance of mass communication technologies in
the area of politics and identity construction by discussing the importance of Internet technology
in the construction of a conception of the Hindu-nationalist community that includes members of
the diaspora. Analyzing the myth construction of the BJP’s website only serves to better
illustrate how the BJP constructs its political message. Considering its myth construction in
tandem with India’s global Hindu diaspora and global media technologies serves to highlight the
possibilities for nation-building.
This paper textually analyzed a small portion of the information the BJP publishes on its
website: www.bjp.org and does not consider other multimedia tools (e.g. video clips) used by the
BJP to relay its political message. In addition, while this thesis connects current research on
globalization, Hindu nationalism, and Internet usage as a way to rationalize the importance of the
Internet in Indian politics, it cannot prove that there exists a definitive link between any of the
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aforementioned theoretical concepts and Internet usage. These limitations necessitate future
research to further explain the significance of websites created by political groups in India.
Future research should analyze usage of www.bjp.org, as well as the effects (e.g. money
donation) of the BJP’s online political message among its supporters in India and abroad, as well
as examine how usage of this website aids in political activism, social awareness, and identity
formation, while being attentive to how the members of India’s diasporas and its indigenous
populations differently respond to these messages. However, most importantly future research
should focus on understanding the depth and diversity amongst India’s middle class in order to
enable better understanding of India’s middle class’ social reality and the social phenomena (e.g.
globalization, immigration) that affect them. A more comprehensive understanding of India’s
middle-class will yield more insightful research.
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